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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from an Intermediate Appellate Opinion affirming a judgment of guilty.
The state alleged that the defendant had violated Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. The Magistrate
Court heard argument and found that I.C. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 on its face did not violate
the requirements of procedural due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Further, the Court heard argument and found that Spirit Lake
Ordinance 7-4-10 did not violate Article I § 13, Article XII § 2, and Article XV §§ 1, 4, and 5 of
the Idaho Constitution on its face or as applied. The Court interpreted Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-410, and the defendant was tried under the Court's interpretation. The Court later denied the
defendant's motion for acquittal. The Court further rejected the defendant's requested
instruction as to the limits of the city's property. The jury found the defendant guilty. The
defendant appealed the judgment. The District Court upheld the rulings of the Magistrate Court
and affirmed the judgment.

B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts

On September 27, 2012, Brenda Nash moved into the home of George Darrell Adams in
Spirit Lake, Idaho. Tr. Vol. II, p. 68, L. 8-16, p. 69, L. 13-25. With her came her son, his three
children and fiancee Jeremy Lombardi, Stephanie Savage, Brooklyn Savage, Skylar Lombardi,
and Aurora Lombardi. Tr. Vol. II, p. 75, L. 13-20. The home had running water, but on July 26,

2012, the city of Spirit Lake had shut off the water and had not turned it back on until October
18, 2012. Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-21, p. 70, L. 16-21.
Also on September 27, 2012, Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department
visited the mobile home of Michael Freitas. Tr. Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 2224. The officer had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose
running from the spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 2225, p. 85, L. 1-21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the
connection point between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr. Vol. II, p.
86, L. 1-20. The officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake
Ordinance, and gave him a copy ofit. Tr. Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day
for violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21.
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on Mr.
Freitas' Motion to Dismiss the charge against him. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 1, p. 22, L. 22-23. Mr.
Freitas and the state stipulated to the factual summary in the state's Brief in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss for purposes of the hearing to provide the Court with a factual basis for the as
applied challenge. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 8-25; p. 2, L.1-16. Additionally, the state called Barbara
Brown, clerk-treasurer of the City of Spirit Lake. Tr. Vol. I, p. 3, L. 15-16, p. 4, L. 15-19.
Ms. Brown testified that the City of Spirit Lake charged residential properties $15 a
month for 12,000 gallons of water and $1.25 for every thousand thereafter. Tr. Vol. I, L. 16-22.
The rates had been in place since either 2006 or 2007. Tr. Vol. I, p. 5, L. 23-25. Ms. Brown
testified that the city tried to keep the prices low, and further, that at least as of a few years ago,
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Spirit Lake's water rates were "fairly low" as compared to a lot of cities in Idaho. Tr. Vol. I, p. 6,

L. 5-11, p. 9, L. 3-25, p. 10, L. 1-7. The city bills based on meters in the summer, and simply
charges a flat rate in the winter. Tr. Vol. I, L. 18-23. Ms. Brown could not state how much water
the average household uses. Tr. Vol. I, p. 6, L. 12-15. She testified that Mr. Freitas had paid for
the water that came to his home and that he had provided to his neighbor. Tr. Vol. I, p. 8, L. 118. Ms. Brown testified that Ordinance 7-4-10 has been enforced prior to this case for sharing
water, because
it's not appropriate, it's against the rules, and no matter where you
live, there are rules.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16.
The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the .cost of water down and for
sanitary reasons. Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. After hearing argument and reviewing the
parties' motions and memorandums, the Court made the following findings as to the procedural
due process challenge:
THE COURT: I certainly can't find that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications. I think there's language within the ordinance which sets forth some very
clear meaning. So as a result, I'll find that uh, the motion to dismiss is
vagueness challenge on its face is denied.
Tr. p. 26, L. 15-20.
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on its void for

THE COURT: It has to create minimum guidelines for uh, those persons in the law
enforcement and judicial community to be able to enforce the statute, also provide people
with reasonable notice, adequate fair warning the prescribed conduct. I think the statute
at issue here is clear. I think it can be read in its many parts given a common sense
reading. It's unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, tum on or
off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or
other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter,
or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of the City water system.
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system,
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly connecting and
delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and then improperly
operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water system, again under
certain circumstances.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 1-17.
The Court went on and appeared to find that the statute also passed rational scrutiny:
THE COURT: Those all seem to be very clear and - - and uh, reasonable. The city
certainly has an interest in uh, being the sole regulators of their water system, and to
permit tampering in the way it's gone on here would essentially be to permit persons to
set themselves up as their own private water delivery services to other individuals, and

4

then the State or the municipality of the states would lose its regulatory control over those
persons.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1.
The Court stated as to the as applied challenge:
THE COURT: It seems clear that the defendant received notice that uh, his neighbor was
not receiving water from the city and that essentially what happened here is in direct
contravention of the statute, which is uh, the defendant deciding that he was going to
circumvent the water delivery system of the municipality and provide water himself to
this other residence, which prohibits the City in this case from having its valid regulatory
concerns regarding the delivery of water, making sure that it's clean, making sure it's
appropriate, billing and restricting its use, and all the other issues that arise from the
delivery of water. So as a result, the Court finds you've failed to meet your burden
regarding the demonstrating the statute as applied is unconstitutional.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 2-16.
Counsel for the defendant requested further findings as to the limits of the ordinance,
whether it conflicted with the general laws, and whether it was not either unreasonable or
arbitrary. Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 9-14. The Court stated:
THE COURT: I think I have to construe statutes to be constitutional. Obviously, the
statute has to be confined to the limits of the jurisdictional limits of the body enacting the
law. Uh, and I have to read the statute that way. I don't find it to be in conflict with
5

other general laws of the State. In fact, I think the State statutes we reviewed specifically
empower municipalities to make these types of uh, enactments. And then that it's not an
unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. I think in my prior recitation I noted that I think
that the uh, ordinance here is both reasonable and not arbitrary. And so I - - I find that
neither of those three factors are applicable here, at least on the information that's before
the Court here today.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25, p. 30, L. 1-4.
After openings, the state called Barbra Brown, the Sprit Lake City Clerk. Tr Vol. II, p.
60, L. 1-25. Ms. Brown testified that the records of the city showed that the water at 5822 West
Rhode Island St., residence of George Adams; was shut off on July 26, 2012, and turned back on
on October 18, 2012. Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, L. 20-25, p. 65, L. 1-21.
The state then called Brenda Nash, who at the time of the incident had lived in George
Adams' home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 67, L. 1-2, p. 69, L. 13-25. Ms. Nash testified that she had been
told that the water coming to her house came from the defendant and that she used it within the
residence. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70, L. 16-21, p. 71, L. 18-23.
The state then called Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department. Tr. Vol.
II, p. 82, L. 3-4, p. 83, L. 8-9. She testified that on September 27, 2012, she visited the mobile
home of Michael Freitas. Tr. Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-24. The officer
had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose running from the
spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-25, p. 85, L. 1-
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21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the connection point
between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 86, L. 1-20. The
officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake Ordinance, and
gave him a copy of it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day for violating
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. When asked whether she had had a
conversation with the defendant, she also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr.
Freitas said that
"it was something to the effect that um, he didn't really realize - - he didn't think that
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor."
Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3.
After Officer Wise the state rested. Defense counsel moved for an acquittal under I.C.R. 29.
The Court denied the motion.
THE COURT: Well, Rule 29 governs motions for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency
of the evidence. The test is whether there's substantial evidence on which rational triers
of fact could find the defendant guilty. And uh, I have to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, keeping in mind that it's the jury that eventually has the job
to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.
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The Court's mindful that where inculpatory evidence is so insubstantial that jurors could
not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element, a judgment of an
acquittal should be entered. However, the prosecution need not have offered direct
evidence on every element of the crime if there is otherwise a sufficient basis for the jury
to find an element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the argument of uh,
Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this time.
Tr. Vol. II, p 95, L. 6-24.
The prosecutor had argued that
[Officer Wise] indicated, when I asked that it was in fact city water, he said he was
paying for it and he could do with it what he pleased.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 94, L. 7-10.
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the prosecutor had inquired of her witnesses
whether the water the defendant was providing was from the City of Spirit Lake.
The Court then held a hearing on jury instructions. The defendant accepted that the
state's elements instruction fit the law of the case and the earlier holding of the Court and did not
object. Tr. Vol. II, p. 98, L. 1-3. The defendant offered proposed jury instruction six, requesting
that the Court instruct the jury that

8

The Spirit Lake City water system is property of the City up to and including any shut-off
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property of any lot.
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 11-14.
The Court denied the instruction.
THE COURT: The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a clarifying uh,
legal instruction that relates to any of the facts in dispute. While the clements certainly
includes uh, delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here regarding what is the
property of what, what is the city water system, et cetera.

(inaudible) ... persist in my ruling and not give that instruction.
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 16-22, p. 100, L. 12-13.
The jury found the defendant guilty. Tr Vol. II, p. 117, L. 22-24. The Court then sentenced the
defendant but ordered his sentence be stayed pending the resolution of his appeal pursuant to
I.C.R. 54.5. Tr Vol. II, p. 122, L. 16-23, p. 124, L. 11-14. The defendant timely filed a notice of
appeal under I.C.R. 54.l(a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court.
The District Court heard argument on July I, 2013, and issued an Intermediate Appellate
Opinion on August 8, 2013, affirming the judgment and the rulings of the lower court. The
defendant timely appealed from the District Court's ruling.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

I.

Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is sufficiently clear to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II.

Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho.

Ill.

Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is confined to Spirit Lake.

IV.

Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary.

V.

Whether Spirit Lake Ordianance 7-4-10 as applied to this case violates the liberty
of conscience guaranteed by the Idaho and United State Constitutions.

VI.

Whether the Magistrate Court misinterpreted the statute and thus the defendant
was tried under the wrong elements.

VII.

Whether the Magistrate Court erred in denying the defendant's motion for
acquittal.

VIII.

Whether the Court erred in refusing to give the defendant's proposed jury
instruction six.
ARGUMENT

I.
A.

Introduction
The Constitution "protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of

noblesse oblige. [The Supreme Court] would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct.

10

1577, 1591 (2010) citing Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001 ).
The District Court erred when it found Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 constitutional in spite of the
fact that it lacks sufficient clarity, is not limited to the municipality, criminalizes everyday
behaviors of Idahoans for either arbitrary or monopolistic purposes, and conflicts with the
General Laws.
B.

Standard for Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates the notice
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face. In order to comport with

the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, a law must use language that
conveys a sufficiently definite description of the proscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen.
15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL 48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v.

Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H & V Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers,
113 Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984):
The requirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of
clarity ensure that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies
reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values, educes the
danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables
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individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits
meaningful judicial review.
Due Process also guarantees that a statute will not be so written as to allow arbitrary and
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d
490 (Colo.1979). Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for
individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. Id. citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, l 00
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Board, 407 N.E.2d (1980); Chief

of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983).
Ordinance 7-4-10 states in relevant part:
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any shutoff valve and/or
meter, which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot, is the
property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or
tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third
persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or introduce any
substance into any part of the city water system unless that person is acting under
the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first obtains express
written permission from the mayor.
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following:
1. Connect to water for use by a third person within a residence or other
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter.
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence
or other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance
with this chapter.
3. Tum on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter.
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a
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residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in
accordance with this chapter.
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with

the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. However, this Court may not correct
absurdity, but must construe the statute as written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical

Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011).
Further, the ordinance begins by stating what parts of the water system are the property of
the city, and ends by prohibiting putting things into the water system. Therefore, strictly
construed, the "water" referred to the operative language is a reference to the water system and
the water that still belongs to the city of Spirit Lake.
The District Court found that the statute could be "understandably broken down."
Intermediate Appellate Opinion at *6. However, that is not the test. The defendant asks this
Court to recognize that, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that so holds, and despite Idaho
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, in the context of criminal laws a Fourteenth
Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge does not require a showing that the law is
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications.
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling precedent
unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 131
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Idaho 239, 240 (1998). Such reasons include where the controlling precedent is manifestly
wrong; where it has proven over time to be unwise or unjust; or where overruling the precedent
is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice. Id.
Prior precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness
challenge to a criminal law to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003)
abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (U.S.Mich.2013); State v.
Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745 (2001); State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773 (2001); State v.
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199 (1998); State v. Bitt, 118

Idaho 584, 587 (1990).
These decisions have universally relied upon the United States Supreme Court decision in
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of this rule. Korsen,

138 Idaho at 712; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784; Cobb, 132 ldaho at 199; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587. 1
However, reliance upon the specific standard from Village of Hoffman Estates is misplaced as it
has been expressly stated by the United States Supreme Court to be an improper standard in the
context of a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge to a criminal law. Ko/ender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999)

(plurality opinion).

1

While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this standard, the Court in Cobb
cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 746, 24 P.3d at 63;
Prather, 135 Idaho at 773, 25 P.3d at 86.
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The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon to
address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a license in
order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its face. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. In the context of this regulatory statute, the Court held

that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto - and
therefore incapable of any valid application."' Id. at 495, n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452,474 (1974)). The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates proceeded to clarify that this
rule was a "less strict vagueness test" than would normally be applied because the ordinance was
an economic regulation and that the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates"
depends upon the nature of the enactment. Id. at 498.
The United States Supreme Court has subsequently specifically articulated that the
standard from Village of Hojfinan Estates that required a showing that the statute was vague in
all of its applications is not the correct standard when the law at issue imposes criminal penalties.
Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358, n.8. In Ko/ender, the Court articulated several reasons

why this standard was inapplicable where the law being challenged is a criminal law.
Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that, where a law imposes criminal
penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." Id. In other words, the Court will require more
definiteness to the language of criminal laws in order to pass constitutional muster, and will
correspondingly impose greater scrutiny to claims that a criminal law is unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. As the Court noted, "this concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal
statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Id.
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The Court in Ko/ender also went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of
Hoffman Estates was a "less strict vagueness standard" applied because, "the ordinance in
Hoffman Estates 'simply regulates business behavior,' and that 'economic regulation is subject
to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow."' Id. (quoting
Village ofHojfinan Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).
In addition, in Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon United States v. Salerno.
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However,just as in Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United States
Supreme Court addressed a regulatory statute, not a statute which imposes criminal punishment:
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process because the
pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, and n. 16 (1979). The Government,
however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were
"punishment." The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the
Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.

Thus, application of the standards articulated m Salerno 1s

inappropriate when the statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e. punishment.
As shown above, prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal law is
impermissibly vague in all its applications is directly contrary to the express holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Kolendar, which articulates the proper standard for a Fourteenth
Amendment based facial-vagueness challenge to a law which imposes criminal penalties. As
such, the line of Idaho cases which apply the "less strict vagueness standard" from cases
addressing regulatory statutes to claims to federal constitutional claims addressing criminal
statutes is manifestly wrong and was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as
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such. Rather, because the defendant brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the statute at issue imposes
criminal penalties, the proper analysis to be applied is that articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Ko/ender, which allows a law which imposes a criminal penalty to be
invalidated on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. 461
U.S. at 358.
Regardless of the test to be applied however, the fact remains that the ordinance is
essentially several sentences enmeshed in such a fashion that while an official may read what
they choose from it, no ordinary person can possibly be expected to understand it. The examples
the District Court gives of its interpretations of the mishmash require that one simply ignore
whole parts of the statute. As the Supreme Court in State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 324, 325
(1990) held:
Ordinarily, we must construe a statute to give effect to all of its parts, if we can,
and not construe it in a way that makes mere surplusage of one of its provisions.
However, there is another principle of statutory construction that must be
considered here. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. In Thompson, the
Court said: "This principle extends not only to the elements of the substantive
crime, but also to the sanctions potentially involved."

citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 29, 153 (1989); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688,
690 ( 1984) (overruled on other grounds, Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166
(1990)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437 (1980); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 338
(195 7). The District Court's constructions are clearly in violation of the rules of interpreting any
statute, and certainly cannot be allowed when interpreting a law that purports to provide the
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government with the authority to place a citizen in a cell. As it stands, the law is too confusing
to provide either reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be
enforced. Therefore, it must be struck down.
D.

The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been drawn.
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-

2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug
Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancrofi, 80

Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950).
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes

the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own,
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See J.C. § 50-323. No
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn.
E.

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the limits set on municipal power under Article XII
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution.
1.
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The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the delivery of
water.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws ofldaho by
I.
claiming powers outside the scope of those provided by LC. § 50-1030(0.

The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of
Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 538 citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 ( 1980); Hendricks v.
City o.f Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98 (1969). If there is a fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the
existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the city. O'Bryant v. City of Idaho
Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 320 (1956), Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83
Idaho 62, 65 (1960).
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers, 90 Idaho at 7 citing Gilbert, 80 Idaho;
Hooton, 70 Idaho. Municipalities are granted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water
system by the Idaho Legislature. See LC. § 50-323. The Legislature further provided that
municipalities may:
... prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or
assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units,
departments or agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the
services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of
collections and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment of such
rates, fees, tolls or charges; ...
LC. 50-1030(t).

The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the
owner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of
service. See Ordinance 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence
or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9.
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The city took an extra step to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-410. The ordinance states:
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any shutoff valve and/or
meter, which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot, is the
property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere
or tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to
third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise
provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or
introduce any substance into any part of the city water system unless that person
is acting under the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first
obtains express written permission from the mayor. [emphasis added]
While unclear, the ordinance arguably makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or
delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water
service in accordance with this chapter.

While this leads to the absurd result that a person

commits a misdemeanor by filling a water bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing
that tap water with a person that does not live in their home while both are in either a home or
building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws must be strictly construed, and the
Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895;

Sivak, 119 Idaho at 325.
The ordinance so interpreted, however, conflicts with the powers granted the
municipality by LC. 50-1030(t). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357
(2003), the Idaho Supreme Court found that a liquor license transfer fee imposed by the city
went beyond its statutory authority. In comparing the city ordinance with state law, the Court
found:

20

The plain language of LC.§ 23-916 provides cities with authority to impose a
license fee, not a transfer fee. The license fees from section 23-904, titled
"License fees," are the fees to which the statute plainly refers. LC. § 23-916
predates the statute allowing the state to collect transfer fees. Therefore, LC. §
23-916 could not have been drafted to include transfer fees, since they were nonexistent when LC. § 23-916 was passed. The legislature has not changed the
relevant language of the statute granting cities authority to collect a "license fee"
since the passage of the transfer fee statute in 1980. The state legislature has not
granted cities the authority to impose a transfer fee. The City exceeded its power
in collecting the transfer fee. (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 358.
In this case, the City of Spirit Lake's authority is limited by LC. 50-1030(f). The state
seeks to expand the list of possible actions a municipality may take regarding its water system to
include criminalizing the delivery of water to third persons in a building or residence that is not
provided with water by the city water system. See Ordinance 7-4-10. The wording of LC. 501030(f) creates a nonexhaustive list of possibilities through use of the word "including." See
Federal Lank Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 ( 1941 ). However, the

list "including" creates is illustrative. Richardson v. National City Bank of Evansville, 141 F.3d
1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1998).
In City of Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 539, the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner
when his tenants failed to pay. The Court found that:
the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage services
provided by the city from those who use the services. This right to collect does
not depend on any expressed or implied power of the city, but rather on principles
of contract law that obligate one who accepts a service to pay for it. What the city
has attempted to do here is to rewrite those principles to allow collection from the
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owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted for, or used by the
owner.
Id. at 538-39. The Court held:

An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered, contracted for,
or used the service would be unreasonable because it would create a liability not
consistent with principles of contract law. We are not prepared to read this power
into these statutes [referring to J.C. §§ 50-323 and 50-1030(f)].
Id. at 539. In other words, though not providing an exhaustive list, LC. § 50-1030(1) does not

grant municipalities plenary authority to do whatever they wish to their citizenry for the good of
the water system.
The City of Spirit Lake relies on its police powers expressed in Article XII § 2 of the
Idaho Constitution.
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits,
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws.
The City also relies on I.C. § 50-302 which states in pertinent part:
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be
expedient, in addition to the special powers in this act granted, to maintain the
peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce
and industry. Cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, including an infraction
penalty, or incarceration; provided, however, except as provided in subsection (2)
of this section, that the maximum punishment of any offense shall be by fine of
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed six
(6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Neither the constitutional section nor the statute, however, can submerge the narrowing of
authority provided in I.C. § 50-1030(±). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statue dealing with a narrow,
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precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where this is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment.").
And so this Court is left with deciding whether criminal penalties are allowable under
J.C.§ 50-1030(£). This question is comparable, if not the same, as the one confronted by the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003). In that case:
[the Court] addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl
constituted lewd conduct. [The] Court held that it did not because the type of
conduct included in the phrase "including but not limited to" must be the conduct
of a like or similar class or character to the types of conduct specifically listed.

State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 528(2011) citing Kavajecz. 139 Idaho at 486-87.
Thus, in the case before this Court, the municipality has been granted powers of a like or
similar class or character to:
... prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or
assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units,
departments or agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the
services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of
collections and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment of such
rates, fees, tolls or charges; ...
LC. § 50-1030(f). The list clearly consists only of civil penalties. An ordinance may not
"classify conduct more harshly than a state statute." State v. Reyes, 146 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App.
2008). As the Reyes Court:
note[ d,] [there are] important policy implications of allowing cities and counties
to criminalize matters the legislature has specifically chosen to decriminalize.
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Allowing cities and counties to reclassify infractions as misdemeanors would lead
to an inconsistent application and enforcement of the laws across the state. A
motorist stopped for an infraction such as speeding in one city would be issued a
citation and subjected to the infraction procedures and penalties, while the same
motorist stopped for speeding in a city that has reclassified speeding as a
misdemeanor may be arrested and taken to jail, request and receive an attorney
and a jury trial, and potentially serve jail time in addition to paying a substantial
fine. Such inconsistent treatment of similarly-situated defendants is not what the
legislature intended or what the law allows.

Id.
In the case before the Court, the District Court found that I.C. § 50-302 and the Art. XII §
2 of the Idaho Constitution submerged the limiting language of I.C. § 50-1030(£). Intermediate
Appellate Opinion at * 11. That holding is in error. First, Art. XII § 2 expressly gives the
legislature the power to narrow and limit the authority it grants municipalities through the
General Laws such as I.C. § 50-1030(£). Second, as previously stated, "Where this is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment." Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-51. I.C. § 50-302 is the very
definition of a general statute, and is clearly !imitable by LC. § 50-1030(£). I.C. § 50-1030(£)
excludes the municipality's power to use criminal penalties in cases involving nonpayment of
water service. Therefore, Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho, and must
be struck down.
2. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is not confined to the limits of Spirit Lake.
A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho
Constitution.
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Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits,
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws.
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of
the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho
365, 374 (1965). Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375.
The ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. Every
person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of water in a home not provided that
water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of these laws. That
would of course be most of Idaho. The Magistrate Court held that the statute must be construed
to be constitutional; however, no such imperative exists. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,
439 (2012) quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,515 (1964) ("It must be
remembered that '[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the
purpose of a statute ... ' or judicially rewriting it." (quoting Scales v. US., 367 U.S. 203,211
(1961))); Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25.
In Blaha v. Board ofAda Count Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 777 (2000), the Court found
that:
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[b]eyond the corporate limits of a city, the county has jurisdiction by statute to
accept and approve subdivision plats. See LC. § 50-1308. For the City of Eagle to
be allowed to exercise co-equal jurisdiction with Ada County in the impact area
lying beyond the city limits would not only be in conflict with the statute but also
inconsistent with constitutional limitations placed on a city's powers. Article XII,
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that any county or incorporated city or
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and
other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.
This Court has held that the power of cities and counties only exists within the
sovereign boundaries of the cities and the counties respectively. See Clyde Hess
Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505 (1949) (valid county
regulation enforceable so far as territory embraced in county was concerned,
exclusive of municipalities where the regulation was without force and effect);
Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789 (1977) (To give effect to a county permit
within city limits would be to violate the separate sovereignty provisions of Idaho
Const., art. XII, § 2.); Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205 (1983) (ordinance or
regulation must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the
same). Therefore, any reading of the implementing ordinances granting the City
the power to restrict development in the impact area by denying approval of a
subdivision application made to the County would be an extraterritorial exercise
of jurisdiction by the City and an infringement on the constitutional right of the
County. (footnotes omitted).

Ordinance 7-4-10 does not limit itself to the City of Spirit Lake and is therefore in violation of
the Idaho Constitution.
3. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary.

A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho
Constitution:
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits,
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws.
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From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by
such provision: ( 1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of
the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho
at 374. Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375.
Ordinance 7-4-10 is argued by the state to make it illegal to provide water being paid for
in one place to a person in a residence or building not provided with water by the City of Spirit
Lake. The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down
and for sanitary reasons. Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. The Magistrate Court found that the city
has an interest in being the sole regulator of water delivery. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L.
1. The District Court let this holding stand by not commenting on it.
As to the state's first contention and the Court's finding oflegitimate purpose, the city's
interest in being sole regulator of water delivery and its need to prevent competition fails to be
proper. The municipality's attempt at monopolization runs afoul of§ 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15
U.S.C. § 18. "Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves
sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), does not apply to
them directly." FTC. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-1160. --- S.Ct. ----, 2013

WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013) citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
370 (1991 ); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-413 (1978) (plurality
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opinion). "At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from
antitrust scrutiny when they act 'pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."' Id. citing Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S., at 413.
In order for a Court to find that Spirit Lake's monopoly does not violate federal law, it
must be able to find that the state clearly articulated its intention that the city could consolidate
power over water delivery by criminalizing the act if done by others. See Phoebe Putney Health

System, Inc., 2013 WL 598434 at *7. In Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court found that the act of a Georgia municipality in buying out its competition was not
protected from the anti-trust act as there was no clear articulation from the state government that
municipalities could behave in such an anticompetitive manner. Id. at *7. The Court found:
Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is insufficient to establish
state-action immunity; the substate governmental entity must also show that it has
been delegated authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. In Boulder, we held
that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to govern local
affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test. There was no doubt in that case
that the city had authority as a matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a
moratorium on a cable provider's expansion of service. But we rejected the
proposition that "the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily
implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances" because
such an approach "would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and
affirmative expression' that our precedents require." We explained that when a
State's position "is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions
challenged as anticompetitive," the State cannot be said to have" 'contemplated'
"those anticompetitive actions.
The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of general corporate
power that allow substate governmental entities to participate in a competitive
marketplace should be, can be, and typically are used in ways that raise no federal
antitrust concerns. As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers "can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' "that they will be used anticompetitively.
Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to acquire hospitals, it does not
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clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy empowering the
Authority to make acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen
competition.

Id. citing Omni, 499 U.S., at 372; Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 4546, 55-56 (1982); IA P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law il 225a, p. 131 (3d ed.2006)
("When a state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the power to do the thing
contemplated, but not to do so anticompetitively").
The City of Spirit Lake is granted authority to run a water system by I.C. § 50-323 which
states:
[c ]ities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain and operate
domestic water systems; provide for domestic water from wells, streams, water
sheds or any other source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission of the
same to the inhabitants of the city; and to do all things necessary to protect the
source of water from contamination. The term "domestic water systems" and
"domestic water" includes by way of example but not by way of limitation, a
public water system providing water at any temperature for space heating or
cooling, culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses.

LC. § 50-323 is a "general grant of power" and does not give cities the right to create
monopolies or act in anticompetitive ways. Ordinance 7-4-10 clearly goes beyond this grant of
authority. Even assuming the ordinance does nothing to prevent a person or corporate entity
from delivering water from an outside source, nothing the state legislature has enacted would
lead one to conclude that they meant for municipalities to establish a stranglehold on the delivery
of water from their own water supply. The statute is unlawful and harms the welfare of the
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community by being anticompetitive in violation of Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution and
LC. § 50-302. It must be struck down.
In addition to violating our national policy of competition, the law is arbitrary. Sharing
water cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from simply paying for
another person's water bill, or having one household pay the minimum water bill but live off the
neighbor's water source. The state's proffered sanitary issue is irrelevant- the city has no
ordinance controlling how the water is delivered to those paying- it has made no attempt to
interdict those who would drink from the hose at their own home or would use rusty lead pipes.
Ordinance 7-4-10 is clearly not related to sanitary issues. The ordinance is utterly arbitrary and
must be struck down.

I I.
A. Introduction
The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. The Court was provided with a summary of
the facts and the testimony of Ms. Brown and found no issue with the application of the statute.
Criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid for to another goes beyond the
boundaries of our national values and this Court should find Ordinance 7-4-10 unconstitutional
as applied to this case.
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B.

Standard of Review
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court

reviews that decision directly and examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,
672 (2008); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711 (Ct. App. 2008). An appellate court exercises
free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814; Powell, 130 Idaho atl25.
C.

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I §§ 1, 13 of the Idaho
Constitution as applied to the facts of this case.
This case is about a man who took pity on a neighbor and gave her, her children, and her

grandchildren water to use at home. No reasonable person could read Ordinance 7-4-10 to have
intended this as a consequence of its unclear language. See Argument LC, supra.
Further, it is well-established that free alienation is a property right. See Bruno v. First

Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boise, 115 Idaho 1104 (1989). But charitable giving is something
more profound; it is a value that predates and is part and parcel of our rights.
'There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the streets should be
severely punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who
opened a vein in the street. It is commanded in the decalogue that no work shall
be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation
founded upon its design the Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of
necessity, charity, or benevolence on that day.'
In 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 91, the learned author observes with reference to
the construction of statutes:
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'If there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to
common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void * * *
When some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happen to be
unreasonable, then the judges are, in decency, to conclude that the consequence
was not foreseen by the Parliament, and, therefore, they are at liberty to expound
the statute by equity and only quoad hoc disregard it.'

Discargar v. City ofSeattle, 171 P.2d 205,209 (Wash.1946) citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188,
189 (N.Y. 1889). Writing in concurrence in Martin v. City ofStruthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 151
(1943) Justice Murphy wrote:
[a]s construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar, the Struthers
ordinance prohibits door to door canvassing of any kind, no matter what its
character and purpose may be, if attended by the distribution of written or printed
matter in the form of a circular or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright
prohibition is warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and
pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary concern is
with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience and annoyance to
householders. But if the city can prohibit canvassing for the purpose of
distributing religious pamphlets, it can also outlaw the door to door solicitations
of religious charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms
from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen and thus
obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul.
Prohibition may be more convenient to the law maker, and easier to fashion than a
regulatory measure which adequately protects the peace and privacy of the home
without suppressing legitimate religious activities. But that does not justify a
repressive enactment like the one now before us. Freedom of religion has a higher
dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal convenience. In these
days free men have no loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom.
A nation dedicated to that ideal will not suffer but will prosper in its observance.
(emphasis added).

Id. citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1937). According to Marriam-Webster, the
word charity originated in the
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13th

Century. Marriam-Webster, charity, http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/charity (last accessed March 7, 2013). The Bible makes many references
to charity, for example:
And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long,
and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up. And
now stays faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.
1 Corinthians 13:3-13.
Thus it is hard to believe that the expression of kindness that is charity is without
constitutional protection. Whether that protection comes from the First, Fifth, Ninth, or
Fourteenth Amendment, or a conglomeration of the four, the fact remains that a law that
punishes giving water to the poor and thirsty is abominable. The Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects from governmental intrusion:
those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply
rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of
constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.FNl 9
FNl 9. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[T]he
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" ( emphasis
added)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (intrusions into
the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" offend rights "older than the Bill of
Rights"); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the law in question
"disrupt[ed] the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 95 (1987) ( "[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental right"); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that at the founding and throughout the 19th century,
"a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy");
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage
and procreation are fundamental"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
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(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes "those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men").

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 n.19 (1997).
Moreover, if Article I § I of the Idaho Constitution, which states:
[a]ll men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety

is to be deemed to have any meaning whatsoever, it should be read to protect a person's right to
freely give of themselves to those less fortunate.
There is a practical reason for courts to acknowledge this, and the District Court did so.
Intermediate Appellate Opinion at* 12. No matter how it tries, the government will likely never
be able to stop the American people from doing good. Outlawing charity will only breed
martyrs. This is not a path that the government of this municipality, state, or nation wants to go
down. This ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually harming our
society's welfare. The District Court found that because other ways of giving were possible
under the circumstances of this case, it was permissible to criminalize this form of charity. The
Court thus splits hairs over giving money rather than giving water. To determine that money
may be freely given but that water may not is truly a sad commentary on our society. The
criminalization of pure good is not permitted under our system of ordered liberty. This
ordinance must be struck down.
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III.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's interpretation of the

ordinance. Due to the Magistrate Court's error, the defendant was tried under the wrong
elements, and the finding of guilt must be reversed.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.

C.

The Magistrate Court's reading of the statute was incorrect, and therefore the defendant
was tried under the wrong elements.
The Magistrate Court construed Ordinance 7-4-10 to mean:
[e]ssentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system,
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly
connecting and delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and
then improperly operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water
system, again under certain circumstances.

Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 10-17. The Court instructed the jury:
the essential elements of the crime of unlawful act re~arding water system which
the defendant is charged are: One, on or about the 2gt of September 2012; two, in
Kootenai County, State of Idaho; three, the defendant, Michael J. Freitas;
permitted connection or delivery of city water; four, to third persons; five, for use
within a residence; six, not otherwise provided with water service. If any of the
above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.
Tr. Vol.II,p.104,L.17-25;p.105,L.1-3.
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The District Court found that this instruction was permissible. However, the ordinance, if
read according to the rules of statutory construction for criminal statutes, has nothing to do with
this case. The ordinance refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or oil: permitting
connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter. The statute is best read to
mean that it would be unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, turn on or off, permit
connection or delivery of water to another within a residence or building- directly from city's
water system. The water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main
distribution line." See Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw
acts that would either do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying- such
as digging up the water line and making a new connection to it. It has no application to water
drawn and properly paid for by a citizen through private, legally connected piping. With this
reading, the ordinance follows the nature and purpose of statutes such as I.C. § 18-4621 (stealing
electrical current) and I.C. § 18-4301-10 (irrigation systems). If this is a reasonable reading of
the statute it must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho at 325. Therefore, the
elements instruction was incorrect at trial and the judgment must be reversed.

IV.
A.

Introduction
The District Court the state failed to provide sufficient evidence for all the elements.
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B.

Standard of Review
On review, this Court must determine whether "the evidence is sufficient to sustain a

conviction of the crime charged." State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930 (1994). This Court
examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven.
State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352,355 (1996).
C.

The state failed to produce sufficient evidence for a conviction.
Under the state's elements instruction, the state had to prove that the water the defendant

provided his neighbors came from the City of Spirit Lake. The state introduced only the
following evidence as to this element- when asked whether she had had a conversation with the
defendant, Officer Wise also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. Freitas said
that:
"it was something to the effect that um, he didn't really realize - - he didn't think that
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor."
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3.
The officer had previously given him a copy of the text of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol.
II, p. 85, L. 1-5.
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As discussed in Argument LC., supra, the Ordinance is not a model of clarity. It is
therefore impossible to draw a conclusion as to where the defendant received his water. He
could very well have been simply arguing about the ordinance. He may have water from a
different water system that goes through a meter. The jury was not instructed that only one
possible source of water could have a meter attached.
The Magistrate Court and the District Court agreed that the jury could reasonably infer
from these statements that the defendant used city water, but that is not supported by the totality
of the circumstances in this case. The facts in this case do not allow a reasonable person to
conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should reverse the
jury's finding.
V.
A.

Introduction
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance

7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury
instruction that the city's property did not extend beyond the meter.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
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C.

The defendant was entitled to his proposed jury instruction.
The defendant requested that the jury be instructed as to the language at the start of the

ordinance. The City of Spirit Lake thought it was important to include it, and the defendant
believed it is as well. The Idaho Supreme Court held, in State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 694
(1987):
Where the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly state the law and are not
inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that
the jury gave due consideration to the whole charge and was not misled by any
isolated portion thereof.

Due to the difficult of deciphering what Ordinance 7-4-10 intends, it is difficult to know whether
or not the language requested is necessary to understand it, but because it is a criminal charge,
the defendant argues that the jury should have been able to view all of the law- particularly since
an element of the crime required the defendant to be using the city's water. The defendant
argues that the intention of the statute was to criminalize someone tapping directly into the city's
waterline and taking water and providing it to those who are not receiving their water legally
from the city. The Magistrate and the District Courts held that the water a person purchases from
the city cannot be given to a third person in a house that is not getting water from the city. Since
that interpretation of the law is in error, the Magistrate's refusal to give this instruction was also
m error.

39

CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to review an ordinance that violates the values of
the community by being both anticompetitive and anticharity. The ordinance is impossible to
understand from a layman's perspective, goes beyond the powers vested in the municipality that
passed it, and most of all an improper and arbitrary abuse of power. This Court must strike it
down and reverse the judgment.
Even if this Court does find a way to save the ordinance from nullification, the
interpretation of the ordinance by the lower Court was faulty, and the whole law was hidden
from the jury's view. The judgment cannot stand, and this Court should reverse it and remand.
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